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Introduction
There has been growing interest in the association 
between politics and health [1]. Studies have inves-
tigated to what extent different political regimes are 
associated with various health outcomes, such as 
suicide rates, self-rated health, and life expectancy 
(LE) at birth. These studies generally compare 
countries with a different political tradition and 
show that progressive or social-democratic (i.e. left-
oriented) regimes have a positive effect on health 
outcomes relative to other political regimes [2–10]. 
The latter is usually explained by the fact that dem-
ocratic, left-oriented regimes tend to favour egali-
tarian ideologies and implement more redistributive 
and preventive (health) policies, which have a posi-
tive effect on population health [11].
This study adds to the current evidence base by 
investigating to what extent differences in regional 
political regimes (i.e. governments with a ‘left’, 
‘centre’, or ‘right’ political orientation) can explain 
inter-regional health differences within a single 
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country. Italy is a particularly interesting case for 
such a comparative analysis. First, all 20 Italian 
regions as shown in Figure 1 are defined by mani-
fold historical, geographical, and socio-economic 
differences [12–14]. At the political level, Italian 
regions have been characterised by different political 
regimes over time, each enjoying considerable and 
increasing autonomy in health policy matters. 
Moreover, in our 30-year study period (which covers 
the 1980–2010 period), considerable inter-regional 
differences in lifespan can be observed. It is unknown 
to what extent these can be attributed to the differ-
ent political regimes, economic conditions, or other 
variations between regions; for instance, with respect 
to cultural factors. For all these reasons, Italy consti-
tutes an interesting analysis of the effect of regional 
politics on regional population health.
We hypothesise that the political orientation of 
regional governments in Italy has had an effect on 
LE at birth, assuming that the main causal pathway 
goes from politics to health (see Figure 2). Also, in 
line with Lundberg et al. [15], we argue that it is the 
institutions, the programmes, and the resources 
they provide to citizens that matter, not the label 
attached to the government parties. Drawing upon 
the work of Starfield [16,17], we understand the 
political context as several interacting systems of 
policies: occupational policies, social policies, eco-
nomic policies, and health policies. These systems 
of policies influence specific practices in different 
non-political subsystems, in terms of power relation-
ships, behavioural or cultural characteristics, environ-
mental characteristics, the social distribution of wealth, 
and, above all, the health system. All of these societal 
factors have been studied with respect to LE [2–
5,10,18], highlighting sufficiently plausible path-
ways from politics to population health.
To investigate the overall effect of regional politics 
on regional LE in Italy, Bayesian time-series cross-
section regressions are used that control for temporal 
and spatial autocorrelation in the data and can con-
trol for a range of unobserved and observed con-
founders. Moreover, the implemented regressions 
Figure 2. Pathways linking the political context to population health.
Source: adopted from Starfield [17].
Figure 1. The 20 regions of Italy.
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accommodate great flexibility in the timing of the 
political effects. The latter ensures reliable estimates 
of the political effects that are independent of a pre-
defined lag-structure. Accordingly, the presented 
methodology is well-suited to estimate the average 
(i.e. longer-term) impact of regional political regimes 
on regional population health.
Data and methods
Background
Between 1945 and 1994, Italian politics was domi-
nated by two major political regimes: the first led by 
the Christian Democratics (Democrazia Cristiana 
(DC)) and the second by the Italian Communist 
Party (Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI)). During 
the early 1990s, the collapse of communism and the 
exposure of a massive corruption scheme in Italy 
initiated a major political crisis, which resulted in a 
dramatic reconfiguration of political parties – both 
at the national and at the regional level [19]. 
Consequently, from 1995 onwards, two political 
poles emerged: the Centre-Right and Centre-Left 
coalitions. Box 1 provides a synthetic description of 
the Italian political regimes.
During the period under analysis (i.e. 1980–
2010), regional governments have had considerable 
sovereignty regarding regional healthcare provision. 
Since 1978, with the establishment of the National 
Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale 
(SSN)), regional governments have been in charge 
of healthcare provision – albeit subject to guidelines 
determined by the Ministry of Health to ensure 
equal access and quality of care [20,21]. During the 
early 1990s, the mounting political crisis and 
increased public deficits culminated into a major 
reform of the SSN. In 1992–1993, legislation was 
approved that aimed to promote the efficiency and 
quality of the healthcare system and to make the 
regional governments more sensitive to the need to 
control aggregate healthcare expenditure. To achieve 
the latter, the central government ceded even more 
responsibility to the regional governments and 
essentially retained only limited coordination and 
supervisory powers over healthcare and health-
related policies [22]. Hence, from 1995 onwards, 
regional governments have had substantially more 
influence on the provision of healthcare, implemen-
tation of preventative healthcare policies, and on the 
financing of the healthcare system. Moreover, since 
a major constitutional reform in 2001, regional gov-
ernments have obtained legislative powers in all 
matters that are not directly under the central gov-
ernment’s remit, including education, the provision 
of social welfare and land, and environment govern-
ance tasks. Accordingly, regional political regimes 
have had considerable and increasing autonomy 
over policies that can affect regional LE during the 
period under analysis, although still subject to 
guidelines and minimum standards as determined 
by the central government [23,24].
Data
To investigate the effect of regional political regimes 
on regional LE in Italy, data on the composition of 
the regional governments from 1975 to 2011 were 
constructed based on carefully selected sources (see 
the online appendix). Figure 3 provides a graphical 
representation of the political regimes over time and 
shows that there is substantial variation over time 
and between regions. The figure also shows that a few 
regions and/or time periods are characterised by 
political regimes that do not conform to the regimes 
as described in Box 1; these are represented by a sep-
arate category referred to as ‘other’.
For the statistical analyses, the information in 
Figure 3 was summarised by a set of dummy varia-
bles with separate dummies used for the DC, PCI, 
Centre-Left, and Centre-Right regimes. This implic-
itly allowed for a structural break in 1995, which 
exactly coincides with the transformation of the 
healthcare system. Also for the ‘other’ category, sepa-
rate effects for before and after 1995 were specified.
Box 1. Description of political regimes in Italy.
Until 1995:
•   Italian Communist Party (left): a left regime, oriented to increase workers’ rights and a redistribution of wealth, relatively anti-
capitalist and free-trade oriented;
•   Christian Democratic (centre): a moderately conservative, centre-oriented regime, partly influenced by socialism, inspired by 
Christianity and Catholic oriented, relatively capitalist oriented;
From 1995 onwards:
•   Centre-right coalition: moderately conservative, Catholic oriented, stronger supporter of family values, more oriented towards 
commercial interests and economic liberalism, and privatisation of State’s goods in general (roughly analogous to the American 
Republicans and the British Conservatives);
•   Centre-Left coalitions: relatively progressive and social-democratic, more oriented towards social liberalism, social welfare, 
environmental issues, and less towards privatisation of State’s goods (roughly analogous to the American Democratic and the 
British Labour Party).
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Annual LE at birth for men and women for all 20 
Italian regions was calculated for the same period. 
The required population and mortality data were 
obtained from the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT), with 2010 being the most recent 
year for which regional mortality information was 
publicly available [25].
Finally, regional real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita was calculated for the period 
1977–2009 using data obtained from ISTAT. Because 
GDP per capita does not have an instantaneous effect 
on LE and small reductions in GDP per capita are 
not immediately translated into decreasing LE, a 
lagged three-year moving average GDP per capita 
variable was used [26]. This better reflects the gen-
eral trend in regional GDP per capita, which is a 
potential confounder and hence included in the 
regressions.
Methods
The impact of regional political regimes on regional 
LE is investigated using Bayesian time-series cross-
section regressions with region-specific intercepts 
(i.e. a fixed-effects specification). The region-specific 
intercepts capture all unobserved differences between 
Figure 3. Composition of regional governments (Giunta Regionale), Italy, 1975–2011.
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Italian regions that are constant over time. To addi-
tionally control for unobserved common time effects, 
which reflect unobserved effects on LE that are vari-
able over time and common to all Italian regions, a 
parsimonious yet flexible combination of a linear 
time trend with a full set of optionally included time 
dummies was used. The time dummies are optionally 
included using Gibbs variable selection [27] and cap-
ture all significant deviations from the linear trend. 
Furthermore, to control for spatial and temporal 
autocorrelation the statistical model accommodates 
first-order spatial and temporal autocorrelation. 
Finally, the model includes the lagged three-year 
moving average regional real GDP per capita as a 
potential confounder and a set of dummies that rep-
resent the presence of political regimes during the 
1980–2010 period.
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of 
the political specification. As can be seen, the devel-
opment of LE over time for the omitted political 
regime is depicted as a linear trend (for simplicity) 
and the impact of the other political regimes is 
measured as the average deviation from this trend 
over a longer period of time. Using data for a single 
region, these deviations would not be identifiable. 
However, making use of the panel structure of the 
data, similarities and differences between regions 
do allow for the measurement of political effects. 
Importantly, the implemented approach avoids an 
a priori specification of the correct lag structure for 
the political effects (indeed, we assume the absence 
of instantaneous effects of regional politics on 
population health). Instead, a ‘fixed’ period is 
defined for political regimes that are in power for at 
least five consecutive years, with up to three pre-
ceding and three ensuing years that are optionally 
included based upon the information in the data. 
This allows the political effects to range from years 
2–5 after the political regimes have come into power 
until years 2–5 after the political regimes are no 
longer in power.
The model specification is programmed in the 
BUGS language and estimated using OpenBUGS, 
which implies that estimation and inference follow a 
Bayesian approach [28–30]. Appendix 1 contains the 
model code and full specification of the prior distri-
butions. We used proper priors that are much more 
diffuse than the posterior distributions, except for the 
pseudo-priors in the time dummy selections, which 
are supposed to be informative [31], and which were 
specified based upon the results of an almost satu-
rated model without the optional inclusion of the 
time dummies.
The model was fitted separately for male and 
female LE. Each estimation started with 50,000 
burn-in Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) itera-
tions to allow the Markov chains to converge, fol-
lowed by a total of 225,000 MCMC iterations to 
reliably approximate the posterior distributions. 
Convergence was evaluated using the Gelman 
et al. [32] criteria based on three parallel chains. 
To improve convergence, the panel-specific inter-
cepts were not estimated, but instead removed from 
the data via first-differencing. This induces negative 
first-order autocorrelation, which was accommo-
dated for using the Prais–Winsten approach [33].
results
The estimated LEs are summarised in Figure 5, 
which depicts the development of regional LE over 
time. As can be seen, LE has increased markedly in 
all Italian regions, but there are substantial differ-
ences in LE between the various regions.
Table I provides the estimation results. After con-
trolling for the (lagged) GDP per capita, common 
time effects, and temporal as well as spatial autocor-
relation, we find no significant effect of regional 
political regimes on Italian LE. The coefficients of 
the Christian Democratic regimes in the period 
before 1995 are consistently negative for both males 
and females, but insignificantly different from zero – 
as indicated by the 95% credible intervals that com-
prise zero. In the period from 1995 onwards, the 
coefficients for the Centre-Right political regimes are 
close to zero and insignificant for both males and 
females – as again indicated by the 95% credible 
Figure 4. Measuring the average impact of regional political 
regimes on regional life expectancy using a flexible lag structure.
t = 0 denotes the moment that a political regime comes into power, 
and t = T, the moment that the political regime is no longer in 
power in this particular region. The dark grey area represents the 
average political effect in the period in which the political effect is 
always measured (i.e. the fixed period), whereas the lighter grey 
areas capture the same effect in the optionally included preceding 
and ensuing years. As can be seen, the average effect of the politi-
cal regime is in Figure 4 assumed to be positive (relative to the 
omitted regime).
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intervals that comprise zero. Finally, the coefficients 
for the ‘other’ political regimes are positive in the 
period before 1995 and negative in the period from 
1995 onwards, and statistically insignificant in both 
periods.
Discussion
Over the last three decades, there has been impor-
tant and significant variation in LE at birth between 
Italian regions, both for men and women. In the 
Figure 5. Regional male and female life expectancy, Italy, 1978–2010.
Table I. Regression results.
Male LE Female LE
Before 1995:  
– Christian Democratic (relative to the Italian Communist Party) −0.01 (−0.14 – 0.12) −0.02 (−0.13 – 0.12)
– Other (relative to the Italian Communist Party) 0.28 (−0.45 – 0.81) 0.20 (–0.28 – 0.66)
After 1995:  
– Centre-Right (relative to Centre-Left) 0.01 (–0.10 – 0.12) 0.00 (–0.10 – 0.11)
– Other (relative to Centre-Left) −0.13 (–19.4 – 19.0) −0.33 (–19.1 – 18.7)
3-year averaged real GDP −0.03 (–0.17 – 0.11) 0.02 (–0.10 – 0.14)
Linear trend 0.28 (0.26 – 0.30) 0.24 (0.22 – 0.27)
rho 1 (temporal autocorrelation) −0.41 (−0.49 – 0.34) −0.38 (–0.47 – 0.30)
rho 2 (spatial autocorrelation) 0.32 (0.20 – 0.45) 0.35 (0.21 – 0.50)
  
R-squared 0.41 (0.33 – 0.48) 0.47 (0.39 – 0.53)
Number of time dummies included:  
– With posterior probability > 0.05   12   14
– With posterior probability > 0.50     4     6
Bayesian 95% credible intervals in parentheses.
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period before 1995, we find no statistically signifi-
cant evidence that the communist, left-oriented 
regime was associated with higher regional LE. In 
the period after 1995, we again find no evidence 
that Centre-Left political regimes were associated 
with higher regional LE.
On the one hand, our findings seem to contra-
dict the general evolution of Italy’s system of gov-
ernment that has, from the early 1970s onwards, 
witnessed a clear devolution of legislative and exec-
utive power from the central government to the 
Italian regions [24]. As previously mentioned, this 
general trend included many competences that are 
expected to influence regional health and LE; for 
example, the provision of healthcare and its financ-
ing, social policies, and welfare [34], but also edu-
cation and environmental conditions, for instance 
via the protection from air pollution, the tutelage of 
water sources and (agricultural) land, the provision 
of waste management, and the monitoring of envi-
ronmental standards [35].
On the other hand, the apparently limited differ-
ential impact of regional politics on regional LE is 
certainly partially attributable to the coordinating 
role that the central government traditionally had 
and continues to have on regional policies. For exam-
ple, even though the principal locus of health-policy 
making shifted towards the regions during the 1990s 
[22], the Basic Levels of Care (BLC) was introduced 
in order to achieve minimum standards and a degree 
of uniformity in the provision of healthcare across 
Italian regions [36]. The same kind of minimum 
standards and coordinating role of the central gov-
ernment can be observed in education and social 
welfare [37].
Regardless of the explanation, our study has 
shown that regional political regimes have appar-
ently, despite the substantial and increasing auton-
omy of the Italian regions, not been able to achieve a 
better relative outcome in terms of LE.
Strengths and weaknesses
Our study has several important limitations. First, 
estimating the average effect of political regimes on 
regional LE over a longer period of time made it 
impossible to differentiate between various direct 
and indirect political effects [5]. Consequently, even 
though it is the institutions, legislations, programmes, 
and resources that regimes provide to their citizens 
that truly affect LE [15,38,39], our study can only 
determine the extent to which broadly defined 
regimes have been able to achieve – on the whole – a 
better relative outcome; although, it should be noted 
that the latter was the research question at hand. 
Second, even though LE at birth is, for various rea-
sons, an attractive outcome measure for health com-
parisons between smaller geographic areas [40], it 
only describes the mortality experience of the 
regional populations and does not reflect differences 
in the morbidity experience of those being alive [41]. 
Alternative summary measures of population health, 
such as healthy or health-adjusted LE, are likely more 
informative about average population health [42,43], 
but the required health-status survey data were una-
vailable for the period under investigation. Also, 
alternative outcome measures, such as age-standard-
ised avoidable mortality, may be more sensitive to 
changes in regional politics and provide a better 
dependent variable in our analysis [44]. The required 
data, however, were unavailable for the earlier part of 
the period under investigation. Finally, the fixed 
effects in our estimations are – by design – collinear 
to the political effects of regions that experience little 
to no change in their political regimes over time. 
Given that several regions indeed experience little 
political change (see Figure 3), our specification has 
less statistical power to establish significant political 
effects than otherwise obtained from a dataset with 
20 regions covering a 30-year time period. By using a 
fixed-effects approach, we thus preferred unbiased 
effect estimates over statistical efficiency, which is 
based on the manifold unobserved cultural, geo-
graphical, and historical differences between the 
included regions that we could otherwise not ade-
quately control for.
The study also has some major strengths. First 
and foremost, the study employed Bayesian time-
series cross-section models that directly controlled 
for many observed and unobserved factors and 
trends that, besides political regimes, have an effect 
on regional LE. For example, fixed effects were spe-
cifically included to control for all structural varia-
tion between regions that remained constant over 
time; for example, cultural and historical differences. 
Furthermore, all effects that changed over time and 
affected all Italian regions simultaneously were 
picked up by the common time effects. Additionally, 
effects that changed over time but only affected a few 
adjacent regions (e.g. an influenza epidemic in the 
north or a major heat wave in the south) were picked 
up by the spatial error terms. Differences in eco-
nomic development between the different regions 
were subsequently controlled for using the included 
GDP per capita variable. Finally, any remaining 
effects were captured by the standard error terms, 
excluding the effects that correlated with the timing 
of the changes in political regimes, which were picked 
up by the political specifications. Given the substan-
tive controls for potential confounders, the political 
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specification is unlikely to reflect any random/spuri-
ous correlations.
Regarding the political specifications, a second 
strength of the study was the use of a Bayesian speci-
fication that avoided the need to a priori specify the 
correct timing of the political effects. Instead, the 
specifications automatically accommodated a flexible 
lag structure and thereby allowed for uncertainty in 
the parameters, as well as in the correct model speci-
fication. Being able to fit such models is a particular 
advantage of a Bayesian estimation framework. 
Finally, we were able to obtain detailed data on the 
different political regimes in all 20 Italian regions 
over a considerable period of time, and able to collect 
data on LE at birth as the outcome measure in this 
study, which is preferred over other more subjective 
and less reliable indicators, such as self-rated health 
[45] and standardised mortality ratios [40].
conclusion
Our results indicate that different regional political 
regimes in Italy have not been able to achieve a better 
relative outcome in terms of LE. An important fea-
ture of the study is that we have demonstrated how 
Bayesian times-series cross-section models can be 
used to analyse the impact of regional political 
regimes on health outcomes, which can be used to 
investigate the impact of regional political regimes on 
other outcome measures as well. Further research is 
required to confirm our results for other and possibly 
more sensitive health outcomes, such as, for example, 
age-standardised avoidable mortality.
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Appendix 1. OpenBUgS model code
model{
# I = 20 regions
# T = 30 years (first-differenced)
# LIKELIHOOD
for (i in 1:I){
# first observation: Prais-Winsten
d1Y[i,1] ~ dnorm( mu1[i], tau1[i] )
mu1[i] <- pred[i,1] + rho[2] * sum( adj_error[ index[i]: (index[i+1] -1),1 ] ) / numNeigh[i]
tau1[i] <- tau[i] * (1-pow(rho[1],2))
# all other observations:
for (t in 2:T){
d1Y[i,t] ~ dnorm( mu[i,t], tau[i] )
#mu[i,t] <- plain prediction + rho[1] * error in previous year + rho[2] * average error of the surrounding areas
mu[i,t] <- pred[i,t] + rho[1] * error[i,t-1] + rho[2] * sum( adj_error[ index[i]: (index[i+1] -1),t ] ) / numNeigh[i]
}}
# PRED & ERROR
for (i in 1:I){
for (t in 1:T){
# note: sum of products is faster than the OpenBUGS “inprod” function
pred[i,t] <- sum(product[i,t, ])
error[i,t] <- d1Y[i,t] - pred[i,t]
}}
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# PRODUCT
for (i in 1:I){
for (t in 1:T){
# d1.Political dummies for DCI
product[i,t,1] <- beta[1] * d1Polit[i,t,1] * ind[1] * ind[2] * ind[3]
product[i,t,2] <- beta[1] * d1Polit[i,t,2] * ind[1] * ind[2]
product[i,t,3] <- beta[1] * d1Polit[i,t,3] * ind[1]
product[i,t,4] <- beta[1] * d1Polit[i,t,4]
product[i,t,5] <- beta[1] * d1Polit[i,t,5] * ind[4]
product[i,t,6] <- beta[1] * d1Polit[i,t,6] * ind[4] * ind[5]
product[i,t,7] <- beta[1] * d1Polit[i,t,7] * ind[4] * ind[5] * ind[6]
# d1.Political dummies for Centre Right
product[i,t,8] <- beta[2] * d1Polit[i,t,8] * ind[1] * ind[2] * ind[3]
product[i,t,9] <- beta[2] * d1Polit[i,t,9] * ind[1] * ind[2]
product[i,t,10] <- beta[2] * d1Polit[i,t,10] * ind[1]
product[i,t,11] <- beta[2] * d1Polit[i,t,11]
product[i,t,12] <- beta[2] * d1Polit[i,t,12] * ind[4]
product[i,t,13] <- beta[2] * d1Polit[i,t,13] * ind[4] * ind[5]
product[i,t,14] <- beta[2] * d1Polit[i,t,14] * ind[4] * ind[5] * ind[6]
}
for (t in 1:15){
# d1.Political dummies for ‘Other’ category before 1995
product[i,t,15] <- beta[3] * d1Polit[i,t,15] * ind[1] * ind[2] * ind[3]
product[i,t,16] <- beta[3] * d1Polit[i,t,16] * ind[1] * ind[2]
product[i,t,17] <- beta[3] * d1Polit[i,t,17] * ind[1]
product[i,t,18] <- beta[3] * d1Polit[i,t,18]
product[i,t,19] <- beta[3] * d1Polit[i,t,19] * ind[4]
product[i,t,20] <- beta[3] * d1Polit[i,t,20] * ind[4] * ind[5]
product[i,t,21] <- beta[3] * d1Polit[i,t,21] * ind[4] * ind[5] * ind[6]
}
for (t in 16:T){
# d1.Political dummies for ‘Other’ category from 1995 onwards
product[i,t,15] <- beta[4] * d1Polit[i,t,15] * ind[1] * ind[2] * ind[3]
product[i,t,16] <- beta[4] * d1Polit[i,t,16] * ind[1] * ind[2]
product[i,t,17] <- beta[4] * d1Polit[i,t,17] * ind[1]
product[i,t,18] <- beta[4] * d1Polit[i,t,18]
product[i,t,19] <- beta[4] * d1Polit[i,t,19] * ind[4]
product[i,t,20] <- beta[4] * d1Polit[i,t,20] * ind[4] * ind[5]
product[i,t,21] <- beta[4] * d1Polit[i,t,21] * ind[4] * ind[5] * ind[6]
}
for (t in 1:T){
# d1.Time dummies
for (d in 22:51){ product[i,t,d] <- b[d-21] * d1Time[t,d-21] }
# d1.GDP
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# CONVENIENT ORDER FOR SPATIAL ERROR TERM
for (i in 1:sumNumNeigh){
for (t in 1:T){
adj_error[i,t] <- error[ adj_areas[i], t]
}}
# R-SQUARED




#for (i in 1:I){ tau[i] ~ dt(0,5,1)T(0,) }
for (i in 1:I){ tau[i] ~ dgamma(1,0.01) }
# political parameters
for (d in 1:6){ ind[d] ~ dbern(0.5) }
for (v in 1:4){ beta[v] ~ dnorm(0,0.01) }
# time trend / GDP parameters
for (v in 31:32){ b[v] ~ dnorm(0,0.01) }
# autocorrelation parameters
for (r in 1:2){ rho[r] ~ dunif(-1, 1) }
# SELECTION OF TIME DUMMIES USING GIBBS VARIABLE SELECTION
for (v in 1:30){
b[v] <- z[v] * ind[v+6]
ind[v+6] ~ dbern(0.5)
z[v] ~ dnorm( 0, pprior[v])
# stdev of 0.4 based on prior runs (without GVS)
pprior[v] <- ind[v+6]*0.01 + (1-ind[v+6]) / (0.4*0.4)
}}
